









Recently, Stefan Wintein published an article in which he presents four objections to my modal-epistemic argument 
for the existence of God. His first objection is an alleged counterexample to the argument’s first premise, and the 
second objection is an alleged counterexample to the argument’s second premise. Wintein’s third objection attempts 
to show that the modal-epistemic argument is circular. Finally, the fourth objection is a parody objection. In this paper, 
I show that Wintein’s four objections all fail. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, Stefan Wintein1 published an article in which he responds to the modal-epistemic 
argument for the existence of God.2 He presents four objections to the argument. What I shall 
argue for is that all four objections fail. 
Wintein3 provides the following formulation of the modal-epistemic argument, which 
accords to the formulation I provided4 and which for the sake of convenience I shall use in the 
remainder of this paper: 
 
1 Wintein, “The Modal-Epistemic Argument for the Existence of God Is Flawed.” 
2 Rutten, “A Modal-Epistemic Argument for the Existence of God.” 
3 Wintein, “The Modal-Epistemic Argument for the Existence of God Is Flawed,” 313. 







″   For every FoCons proposition p that is true in some possible world w there is 
some possible world w′ (such that p is true in w′ and) such that there is a subject in w′ 
that knowsR that p. 
P2     It is not the case that there is a possible world in which there is a subject that 
knowsR that there is no personal first cause. 
P3     The proposition that there is no personal first cause is a FoCons proposition. 
C      In every possible world there is a personal first cause. 
 
Here a FoCons proposition is a first-order consistently believable proposition. A first-order 
proposition only states something about the world itself, such as that Amsterdam is the capital of 
the Netherlands or that John left Amsterdam. First-order propositions do not state something 
about the propositional attitudes of a subject.5 The propositions “John knows that he left 
Amsterdam” and “Mary does not know that Amsterdam is the capital of the Netherlands” are 
thus not first-order propositions. A consistently believable proposition is a proposition for which 
it holds that believing it is not self-contradictory.6 Propositions such as “There are no conscious 
beings” or “Nothing exists” are thus not consistently believable. 
For the modal-epistemic argument I employ a specific conception of knowledge that 
requires near-certainty produced in such a way that it isn’t the result of dogmatism or other 
epistemically improper conditions. On the conception I employ, for a subject S to know that p is 
true, S cannot sincerely or genuinely doubt that p is true. That is, S cannot but believe that p is 
 
5 Ibid., 393. 





true. Such a degree of certainty is obtained when a proposition is (i) deductively proven, (ii) self-
evident, (iii) grounded in indisputable sensory or inner experience (including indisputable 
memory), or (iv) based on indisputable testimony.7 In his article Wintein refers to this specific 
conception of knowledge as knowledgeR. I shall use this notation in what follows. The structure 
of the rest of my paper is straightforward. In the next four sections I shall successively present 
and refute each of Wintein’s objections against the modal-epistemic argument. I start with 
discussing Wintein’s fourth objection in the next section, and shall in subsequent sections discuss 
respectively his third, second and first objection. The reason for this is that I want to deal with 
the least forceful objections first, which can be relatively swiftly done, before I move on to refute 
the more compelling objections, which will take a bit more time. The sixth and last section 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. The Fourth Objection: A Parody Objection to the Modal-Epistemic Core Argument 
In his article Wintein8 argues extensively that I am committed to:  
 
(*) A proposition p is knowableR by some subject if and only if p is knowableR by a 
personal first cause. 
 
 
7 Ibid., 387. 





In the next section I show that (*) is false. So I’m not committed to (*). But for the sake of 
argument I assume in the current section that (*) holds. Wintein9 points out correctly that (*) 
entails that premises P1





*   All possibly true FoCons propositions are knowableR by a personal first cause. 
P2
*   The proposition that there is no personal first cause is not knowableR by a personal 
first cause. 
 
In its unabridged form premise P1
*  states that for any proposition p that is true in some possible 
world w there is some possible world w′ such that p is true in w′ and such that there is a personal 
first cause in w′ that knowsR that p.
10 Wintein calls the valid argument with premises P1
*, P2
*  and 
P3
  and conclusion C the (modal-epistemic) core argument. Clearly, if we assume (*) the modal-
epistemic argument is logically equivalent to the modal-epistemic core argument. But then the 
modal-epistemic argument is refuted if and only if the modal-epistemic core argument is refuted. 
More specifically, a successful parody objection to the modal-epistemic core argument extends 
to a successful parody objection to the modal-epistemic argument. Now, Wintein proposes the 
following parody objection to the modal-epistemic core argument. 
 
K1   All possibly true FolKri propositions are knowableR by Saul Kripke. 
K2   The proposition that Saul Kripke does not exist is not knowableR by Saul Kripke. 
K3   The proposition that Saul Kripke does not exist is a FolKri proposition. 
 
9 Ibid. 





CK   The proposition that Saul Kripke exists is necessarily true. 
 
Here 
[a] FolKri proposition is any proposition that is expressible by a sentence of a first-order 
language with identity, without any predicate or function symbols and with a single constant 
symbol k that refers to Saul Kripke. Thus the proposition that everything is self-identical, 
which can be expressed as “∀x(x = x)” is a true FolKri proposition. The proposition that not 
everything is identical to Saul Kripke, “¬∀x(x = k),” is another true FolKri proposition.11 
 
Now, surely, it would be absurd to accept the conclusion that Saul Kripke exists necessarily, as 
Wintein rightly points out. We thus cannot accept the parody argument. But then, as Wintein’s 
parody objection goes, we cannot accept the modal-epistemic core argument either. And thus, if 
(*) were indeed true, which as mentioned I accept for the sake of argument in this section, we 
cannot accept the modal-epistemic argument itself. It is untenable and must be rejected.  
Is this fourth objection convincing? I don’t think so. The problem is that the proposed 
parody argument to the modal-epistemic core argument is in fact not a cogent parody argument 
at all. The reason for this is that, contrary to premise P1
*, premise K1 is obviously false. Let me 
explain why. Consider the following FolKri proposition: ∃x(x = x and ∀y(y = x)). This 
proposition reports that the world contains precisely one thing. There is also a FolKri proposition 
that reports that the world contains precisely two things, namely ∃x∃y(¬(x = y) and ∀z(z = x or 
z = y)). Similarly, the following FolKri proposition reports that the world consists of precisely 
three things: ∃x∃y∃z(¬(x = y) and ¬(y = z) and ¬(x = z) and ∀w(w = x or w = y or w = z). 
 





These formulas straightforwardly generalize. For each natural number n there is a FolKri 
proposition that reports that the world contains precisely n things. Let me refer to such a 
proposition by World(n). Now, although Saul Kripke “may know his logic” as Wintein12 rightly 
points out, knowing your logic is surely not sufficient to know how many things the world 
precisely contains – let alone knowing this with near-certainty. But then K1 is indeed obviously 
false. There are many sufficiently large natural numbers n such that the FolKri proposition 
World(n) is possibly true and yet unknowableR by Saul Kripke. I conclude that Wintein’s parody 
argument is not a successful parody argument against the modal-epistemic core argument. So, 
even if I for the sake of argument provisionally accept in this section that (*) holds, Wintein’s 
fourth objection against the modal-epistemic argument does not go through. It does not result in 
a successful refutation. 
 
3. The Third Objection: The Core Argument Is Circular 
Wintein’s third objection is also based on his claim that I am committed to (*). He argues13 that 
the modal-epistemic core argument already reveals itself – thus even without considering any 
parodies of it – that it cannot be accepted. But then, as (*) entails that the modal-epistemic 
argument is untenable if and only if the modal-epistemic core argument is untenable, it follows 
immediately that the modal-epistemic argument has to be rejected. As he writes: 
  
First, it is trivially true that no proposition that implies that there is no personal first cause is 
knowableR by a personal first cause. And so, in contrast to P1″, premise P1*  wears its 
 
12 Ibid., 322. 





presupposition – that all [propositions that imply that there is no personal first cause] are 
necessarily false – on its sleeves. As such, the core argument thus allows us to see more 
clearly the main flaw of the modal-epistemic argument. Second, given the presupposition 
that all [propositions that imply that there is no personal first cause] are necessarily false, 
premise P2  is effectively a tautology [,which] is clearly revealed by P2*. […] The core 
argument simply reveals that the modal-epistemic argument presupposes its conclusion in a 
more explicit way.14 
 
In short, Wintein’s objection is that since the modal-epistemic core argument is clearly circular 
and thus untenable, it follows that the modal-epistemic argument is untenable as well. 
Is this third objection successful? No, surely not. Because (*) is plainly false. A personal 
first cause may indeed be a very strong knowerR as Wintein points out. A personal first cause 
may knowR a great many propositions. In his article Wintein successfully argues that I am 
committed to the former claim. He does this by providing an overview of various propositions I 
take to be knowableR by a personal first cause, such as “There is a personal first cause,” “A 
Spaghetti monster does not exist” and so-called Gödel propositions. But from this it does not 
follow that I am committed to the claim that each and every proposition knowableR by some 
subject is knowableR by a personal first cause.  
And indeed, I shall show that this claim is false, i.e., that the left-to-right direction of (*) 
does not hold. Consider the following counterexample to the left-to-right direction of (*). 
KnowledgeR is a very strong conception of knowledge. Due to its quite demanding nature it 
seems plausibly true that – to borrow from Thomas Nagel’s famous example15 – only a bat can 
 
14 Ibid. 





knowR what it is like to be a bat. What it is like is the subjective character or quality of the 
experience. A bat could knowR this by indisputable inner experience. To knowR what it is like to 
be a bat amounts to first-person self-knowledge that is only available with near-certainty to bats 
or perhaps beings sufficiently similar to bats. A personal first cause is not sufficiently similar to a 
bat – let alone equal to a bat. Hence a personal first cause is not capable of knowingR what it is 
like to be a bat – neither by indisputable inner experience nor by any of the other sources of 
knowledgeR I have identified.
16  
Further, it seems to me plausibly true that (at least part of) what it is like to be a bat can be 
expressed by a (complex) proposition q. But then proposition q is a counterexample to the left-
to-right direction of (*). For q is possibly true and knowableR by a bat, but unknowableR by a 
personal first cause. So (*) is false. I conclude that Wintein’s third objection fails.  
Yet, let all of this pass for the sake of argument. Let’s assume for the sake of argument that 
my counterexample doesn’t hold water. Would it then follow that Wintein’s third objection 
succeeds? This is not the case. Even then I’m still not committed to principle (*). For again, the 
fact that a personal first cause is indeed a quite powerful knowerR only entails that many, and 
perhaps even the vast majority of all knowableR truths are knowableR by a personal first cause. 
But this does nothing to establish that all knowableR truths are so knowableR. I can therefore 
remain agnostic as to whether this is the case or not. So even then the third objection fails.  
Moreover, in addition to the counterexample I suggest above, one could think of other 
potential counterexamples, such as for example counterfactuals of (libertarian) freedom for 
human beings or other creaturely beings sufficiently different from a personal first cause. 
Counterfactuals of (libertarian) freedom are propositions of the form “agent S would 
 





(libertarianly) freely do action A in circumstances C.” Agent S (libertarianly) freely does A if and 
only if S does A and S could have done otherwise. Agent S could have done otherwise just in 
case it was possible that in exactly the same circumstances agent S does something else than 
performing action A. The debate as to whether a personal first cause could know what a 
genuinely libertarian creaturely free agent would do once placed in certain circumstances is 
certainly not settled yet. So called “middle knowledge” accounts of how this might work are 
problematic – to say the least17 It might therefore very well be the case that it is simply 
impossible for a personal first cause of reality to know counterfactuals of libertarian freedom of 
creaturely agents – let alone knowR them. For as earlier mentioned the notion of knowledgeR is a 
quite demanding conception of knowledge indeed. It requires a form of certainty that is not 
easily obtained. Counterfactuals of (libertarian) freedom for creaturely beings constitute a 
counterexample to (*) in case they are knowableR by a (libertarian) creaturely free agent but 
unknowableR by a personal first cause. 
Both counterexamples above are counterexamples to (*). Now, one may respond that in 
fact Wintein does not need (*) for his third objection. It is sufficient for him to posit the weaker 
 
(**) A FoCons proposition p is knowableR by some subject if and only if p is 
knowableR by a personal first cause. 
 
Here the non-trivial left-to-right direction only has it that knowableR FoCons propositions are 
knowableR by a personal first cause. Does positing (**) instead of (*) render Wintein’s third 
objection successful after all? In what follows I argue that this is not the case. First, as long as no 
 





reasons – let alone sufficiently compelling reasons – are given for endorsing (**), one should 
remain agnostic as to whether (**) holds as a universal truth. In fact, the rationale I provided 
earlier for being agnostic about (*) applies – slightly modified – to (**) as well: Even if we take 
it that a personal first cause knowsR the vast majority of FoCons truths, it does not follow – pace 
the weight of tradition – that all FoCons truths are so knowableR. Perhaps Wintein would at most 
be able to establish the left-to-right direction of (**) as a defeasible or exception permitting rule. 
But this does not restore the objection, since in that case the left-to-right direction of (**) is not 
deductively valid. It therefore no longer follows that the modal-epistemic argument is logically 
equivalent to the modal-epistemic core argument, which is essential for the objection to work. 
Second, the aforementioned two counterexamples to the left-to-right direction of (*) can be 
slightly modified in order to refute the left-to-right direction of (**) as well. Let me explain. A 
first-order proposition is by definition a proposition that does not report a propositional attitude 
of a subject.18 That is to say, it does not report a propositional intentional state of the mind such 
as “S believes that P” or “S knows that P.” The restriction to first-order propositions blocks a 
specific class of counterexamples to the first premise of the simplified modal-epistemic 
argument, namely all counterexamples involving reports of propositional attitudes such as “John 
left Amsterdam and nobody knows it,” “Nobody knows this proposition” and “There are no 
known propositions.”19 Note that a first-order proposition may still report (an expressible part of) 
a mental state of a subject. It may report (an expressible part of) a non-intentional mental state 
(e.g., itches or moods) or (an expressible part of) a non-propositional intentional mental state 
(e.g., seeing a cat or imagining being on the moon). For in order to block the aforementioned 
 
18 Rutten, “A Modal-Epistemic Argument for the Existence of God,” 393. 





specific class of counterexamples to the simplified argument’s first premise, it is not needed to 
restrict the scope of propositions even further to propositions that do not report mental states. It’s 
sufficient to exclude propositions that report mental states towards other propositions. In other 
words, it’s sufficient to exclude higher-order propositions. 
Now, take the first counterexample. Proposition q reports (part of) what it is like to be a 
bat. What it is like to be a bat is not solely a propositional attitude. More specifically, q does not 
solely report a propositional attitude. Thus there is a part of q that does not report a propositional 
attitude. Let’s refer to that part of q as q2. Proposition q2 reports either non-intentional mental 
state(s), non-propositional intentional mental state(s), or a combination thereof. But then q2 is in 
fact a first-order proposition. As in the case of the original counterexample to (*), proposition q2 
is knowableR by indisputable inner experience. So, q2 is a FoCons proposition. And for similar 
reasons as before q2 is knowableR by a bat, but unknowableR by a personal first cause. Hence q2 
is a counterexample to the left-to-right direction of (**) and Wintein’s third objection still fails. 
As to the second counterexample, counterfactuals of (libertarian) freedom are in fact 
FoCons propositions. For propositions of the form “Agent S would (libertarianly) freely do 
action A in circumstances C” are consistently believable and do not report a propositional 
attitude of agent S. The second counterexample thus also refutes the left-to-right direction of (**) 
and Wintein’s third objection still fails. One may respond that it is not sufficiently clear that 
counterfactuals of (libertarian) freedom are FoCons propositions. Don’t they state something 
about propositional attitudes after all, namely that in circumstances C agent S wants that or 
desires that “Action A is performed by subject S”? This is however not the case. As mentioned 
earlier, S (libertarianly) freely does A in C if and only if (i) S does A in C and (ii) S could have 





something else than A. Neither (i) nor (ii) report a propositional attitude. The proposition in 
question is thus indeed a FoCons proposition. It only reports which action of a collection of two 
or more possible actions a (libertarian) free agent would perform when placed in certain 
circumstances. But then the second counterexample is a counterexample to the left-to-right 
direction of (**) as well. 
 
4. The Second Objection: A Counterexample to Premise P2 
The second objection is an alleged counterexample to premise P2 of the modal-epistemic 
argument. Premise P2 holds that it is not the case that there is a possible world in which there is a 
subject that knowsR that there is no personal first cause. In short, P2 asserts that the proposition 
“There is no personal first cause” is unknowableR. Here is Wintein’s alleged counterexample: 
 
[C]onsider a possible world in which there are (exactly) two personal uncaused causes, which 
we call A and B. These uncaused causes are co-creators of the world in the sense that 
everything that there is, except for A and B, (which are uncaused and so not created) is jointly 
created by A and B. […] If A and B co-created the world, they can plausibly knowR that they 
did on the basis of source (iii): their indisputable experience of creating the world. […] It is 
also plausible that a personal co-creator of the world can knowR that he is such a co-creator 
on the basis of direct intuition. Finally, […] it is also plausible that a personal co-creator of 
the world can knowR that he is such a co-creator on the basis of an indisputable inner 
experience of his own nature.20  
 
 





Wintein maintains that to the extent that it is plausible that there can be a personal first cause that 
knowsR its own nature (i.e., being a personal first cause) by indisputable experience or direct 
intuition, it is also plausibly possible that there is a personal co-creator of the world that knowsR 
his own nature (i.e., being a co-creator of the world) in at least one of those same ways. Now, as 
Wintein argues, given that I am committed to the former possibility, I should also be committed 
to the second possibility. So, then, I have to concede that it is possible for there to be a subject 
(namely A (or B)) that knowsR that he is a co-creator of the world. Subject A knowsR that there is 
no personal first cause since there being a co-creator of the world implies that there is no 
personal first cause. This is implied because the mereological sum or fusion of person A and 
person B does not constitute a personal first cause. After all, sums of persons are not themselves 
persons.21 But then I have to concede that P2 is false. 
Is the second objection convincing? It fails because there is a significant difference 
between both cases. A personal first cause is the sole source of all being. Everything that exists 
originates directly or indirectly from such a person. A personal first cause sits at the root of 
reality. It is the metaphysical ultimate. All being ultimately comes from it. But then it is plausible 
that there can be a personal first cause that also knowsR that all being originates from him. A 
conscious being that is really positioned at the root of all being, finds himself in a maximally 
ideal epistemic position. Without having to “reach out” beyond himself to the world he can 
obtain said knowledge by for example indisputable inner experience of his own nature. But then 
it does not seem to be impossible for there to be a personal being that also knowsR that he is the 
first cause of reality.22 
 
21 Ibid., 319. 





The situation of co-creator A is quite different. Person A is not the single source of all 
being. Since A is a co-creator he is not himself the ultimate root of reality. For person B has not 
been caused by him. Co-creator B and all beings caused by B have not been caused by A. Person 
A thus does not occupy the ultimate privileged position that a personal first cause of reality 
occupies in the order of being. But then how could A knowR that there is no personal first cause? 
Person A cannot deductively or logically prove that there is no personal first cause. For the 
proposition “There is no personal first cause” is not a tautology nor a conceptual or analytical 
truth. Nor can A knowR that there is no such cause by intuition. For it isn’t self-evident or 
obviously true that there is no personal first cause of reality. Testimony will not work either. For 
only a personal first cause might act as such a witness. But in this case there is no personal first 
cause.23 Could A perhaps rely upon indisputable inner experience of his own nature? No, this 
will not help either. Since A is a co-creator his own nature does not encompass the whole of 
being. He thus has to “reach out” to the world in order to obtain said knowledge. But how could 
A do this? What could A knowR by means of indisputable outer experience? In any case it seems 
impossible for A to experience indisputably that B is uncaused. Person B’s testimony of being 
uncaused seems also not sufficient to bring A in a state of near-certainty with respect to B being 
uncaused. For how could A eliminate the possibility that B doesn’t knowR himself or doesn’t tell 
A the truth? Thus A does not knowR that B is uncaused. 
The only scenario left to consider is the following. Person A experienced that he was not 
caused. Person A experienced as well that he did not cause B. If the latter experience of A is 
indisputable, A knowsR that he did not cause B. If the former experience of A is also indisputable, 
A knowsR  that he is uncaused. So, assuming that both experiences are indisputable, A knowsR the 
 





following two propositions: (a) A is uncaused, and (b) B has not been caused by A. From 
propositions (a) and (b) it follows that there is no first cause and thus also no personal first cause. 
I show how. Suppose for reductio ad absurdum that there is a first cause of reality. Person A is 
not the first cause because B has not been caused by A. But then A must have been caused. Yet, A 
is uncaused. We arrive at a contradiction. But then it follows that there is no first cause. One may 
hold that this is how co-creator A knowsR that there is not a personal first cause of reality. So, 
does Wintein’s second objection succeed? 
No, this is not the case. First, how can co-creator A indisputably observe that he didn’t 
cause B? What A may have indisputably observed is the fact that he did not directly cause B. But 
from this it doesn’t follow that he hasn’t indirectly caused B via, say, a lengthy causal series that 
originates in A and includes B as a member. How could A rule out by indisputable experience 
that such a causal chain didn’t obtain? This seems impossible. But then A does not knowR 
proposition (b) and Wintein’s objection fails. However, let this pass for the sake of argument. 
Let’s assume that person A knowsR proposition (b). Will this help the objector? No, it will not. 
The reason for this is that person A doesn’t knowR proposition (a).  
Let me explain. The fact that A experienced not being caused is not sufficient for him to 
knowR that he is in fact uncaused. For A cannot rule out with near-certainty that he has been 
caused by a cause that he simply cannot experience because it originates from some sector or 
dimension of reality that escapes him. After all, A doesn’t occupy the root of reality. Therefore, 
even though he knowsR that he created a realm of beings together with person B, and even if we 
would assume – contrary to what I’ve argued above – that A might knowR that B is not directly or 
indirectly caused by himself, A does not knowR that there is no personal first cause. Indeed, for 





personal first cause. This state of affairs cannot be sufficiently epistemically eliminated by A. So 
he does not knowR that there is no personal first cause. Indeed, only a conscious being that solely 
sits at the ultimate root of all reality could potentially knowR what is ultimately the case with 
respect to the origin of the whole of reality. A conscious being that does not occupy that ultimate 
privileged position in the order of being, such as a co-creator, is not able to establish with near 
certainty that there is no personal first cause. 
I conclude that Wintein’s proposed counterexample to premise P2 does not succeed. Now, 
perhaps one could still respond that both co-creators could knowR that they co-created the world 
– and thus that there is no personal first cause – in case we assume they are “unified” or 
“integrated” into a single being. Yet, this response fails as well, because in that case we do not 
have two separate co-creators. Instead we would have a single being that is the first cause of 
reality and that has multiple (namely two) personal identities. But then there is in fact a personal 
first cause of reality. 
 
5. The First Objection: A Counterexample to Premise P1ʺ 
The first objection put forward by Wintein seems to me the most promising one. He purports to 
present a counterexample to premise P1
″ . That is to say, he aims to present a FoCons proposition 
that on my account of possibility is both possibly true and yet unknowableR. If such a proposition 
can be found I have indeed no choice but to abandon premise P1
″. For this premise has it that all 
possibly true FoCons propositions are knowableR. The alleged counterexample put forward by 
Wintein is the following proposition: “The only conscious beings are naturally evolved animals 
and humans.”24 In what follows I shall refer to it as proposition Q. 
 





I fully agree with Wintein that Q is unknowableR.
25 So all comes down to the question of 
whether I am committed to hold that Q is possibly true. Proposition Q entails that there is no 
conscious being that is the first cause of reality (i.e., no personal first cause). Note that Wintein 
correctly points out that it thus cannot simply be asserted that Q is possibly true, since that would 
amount to a direct denial of the conclusion of the modal-epistemic argument – which according 
to Wintein and myself is not a good objection.26 However, Wintein does not simply assert that Q 
is possibly true. Instead of directly denying the conclusion of the argument he argues that I am 
committed to accept that proposition Q is possibly true: 
 
[Proposition Q] is both logically consistent and conceivable which, on a liberal notion of 
metaphysical possibility, are jointly sufficient for the (metaphysical) possible truth of [Q]. 
[…] Rutten is clearly committed to a liberal notion of metaphysical possibility.27 
 
I’m not sure what is precisely meant by a “liberal” notion of metaphysical possibility. In any 
case I do not hold that all logically consistent and conceivable propositions are possibly true. My 
personal view is that our modal intuitions only warrant us to adopt the following defeasible rule: 
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we may infer, about any logically consistent and 
conceivable proposition that it is possibly true. But let this pass. Let us assume that I am 
committed to logical consistency and conceivability being jointly sufficient for metaphysical 
 
25 Ibid.,  315. 
26 Rutten, “A Modal-Epistemic Argument for the Existence of God,” 398; Wintein, “The Modal-






possibility. Do I then have to accept that proposition Q is possibly true? No, I do not. For 
although proposition Q surely is logically consistent, I maintain that – assuming a notion of 
conceivability strong enough to entail metaphysical possibility – Q may not be conceivable. One 
could perhaps imagine one or more conscious beings arising from matter – similarly as one could 
imagine pigs flying through the sky to borrow an example from Chalmers28 – but that may not be 
sufficient to conclude that it is conceivable that conscious beings arise from matter. For an 
account of conceivability strong enough to entail possibility may require more than perceptual or 
visual experience. Entertaining visual images may not be sufficient. For a proposition p to be 
conceivable in such a way that conceivability entails possibility it may be required to provide a 
coherent and sufficiently detailed explanatory account enabling us to cognitively understand how 
or under which circumstances proposition p could be true. In other words, one may need to offer 
an intelligible scenario, understandable configuration, or comprehensible model that – regardless 
of whether it actually obtains – would render p intelligible if it (counterfactually) obtains. Such 
an account of conceivability would require us to (i) grasp the concepts in the proposition and (ii) 
construe from our available background knowledge a comprehensible “mechanism” that makes 
the proposition in question true. In other words, we may need to posit “explanatory mechanics” 
for p. What may be required is a consistent narrative without substantial explanatory gaps that 
coherently expresses an understandable set of circumstances under which p would be true. In 
short, it may be needed to show in which way proposition p could be true. And doing so goes 
beyond entertaining visual imaginary. 
Conceivability thus understood may not be a perfect guide to possibility. But then again, 
how else could we justify modal claims about what is possible? Precisely because conceivability 
 





is not a perfect guide to possibility, we should use it only as a default or prima facie rule for 
possibility. On this specific notion of conceivability I am not committed to hold that proposition 
Q as proposed by Wintein is conceivable. In what follows I show why. 
In the neuroscientific literature and in the philosophy of mind literature one finds numerous 
theories of consciousness. The problem with all of these theories though is that they do not 
render proposition Q conceivable in the sense I’ve described above. None of these theories 
provides a narrative that makes it understandable and intelligible how matter could generate 
consciousness. They either do not even raise the question because they only address what David 
Chalmers29 has famously called “easy problems” (a systematic inquiry into the functional 
properties of conscious processes and the way these processes correlate with brain processes) or 
they settle what Chalmers calls “the hard problem” (where does subjective inner experience 
come from?) by mere stipulation. As to the former: solving easy problems does indeed not 
provide us with an account of how consciousness could arise from mere matter. For theories 
solving easy problems presuppose the existence of consciousness and merely aim to investigate 
its functional characteristics and neural correlates. Examples include the investigation of 
perception, memory, information integration, behavioral control and attention. As to the latter, 
most if not all theories explain the coming into being of consciousness from mere matter by 
referring to “emergence” or equivalents thereof. In short, these theories proclaim that simple 
material configurations evolved over time into complex material configurations and beyond 
some complexity threshold certain kinds of material structures gave rise to consciousness. But 
such accounts are not sufficient to render proposition Q conceivable. Speaking of “emergence” is 
just a way of stipulating that subjective inner experience arises beyond a certain threshold. It 
 





does not provide an intelligible mechanism. There remains a huge explanatory gap between 
material structures and the coming into being of a wholly distinct kind: subjective inner 
experience. Material structures are from an ontological point of view nothing more than 
spatiotemporal arrangements of material particles. And however functionally complex those 
material structures might become over time through natural evolution, they remain in the end 
precisely what they are: solely material structures. 
The fact is that we do not even have the beginning of a compelling model, mechanism or 
account that renders Q conceivable in the way I’ve described above. And therefore it’s unclear 
that Q is conceivable. But then I am not committed to the claim that Q is possibly true. I can 
leave the matter open and remain agnostic as to whether Q is possibly true or not. Thus unless 
and until Q is rendered conceivable by some understandable narrative that explicates how Q 
could be true, Q does not constitute a counterexample to premise P1
″. Therefore Wintein’s first 
objection fails as well. 
One may rebut that my response raises a profound difficulty for the modal-epistemic 
argument. For isn’t it on the above notion of conceivability also inconceivable how matter could 
arise from consciousness? If so, I would not be allowed to posit a possible world in which a 
personal first cause (being a conscious being) creates a (partly) material universe. This however 
goes too quick. Even if it would be inconceivable how matter could arise from consciousness, a 
problem for the argument does not occur. For I do not appeal to a possible world in which matter 
arises from consciousness in order to defend the argument’s premises or to refute objections 
against the argument. There are two types of possible worlds I appeal to. First, I appeal to 
possible worlds that do not refer to God but contain (i) planets made from iron, (ii) hermetically 





technology or visual apparatus is highly advanced – or whose members can observe an extensive 
geographical area on our planet with the same immediacy and resulting degree of certainty as we 
can observe our hands, (iv) stars that for some physical reason always emerge in pairs, or (v) 
observers that are able to observe particles without having to rely on light waves.30 None of these 
possible worlds refer to matter arising from consciousness. And there are no good reasons for 
why the possible worlds of the first type I appeal to would be inconceivable. Plausibly, these 
possible worlds are conceivable. 
Second, I appeal to possible worlds that explicitly refer to God: a world where God exists 
and reveals his existence to someone by direct revelation; a world where God exists and knows 
he is God; a world where God exists, in which God is good and in which God knows his moral 
nature by indisputable experience in the form of introspection; a world where God exists and 
decides not to create anything; a world where God exists and decides to create exactly one 
causally inert external (material or immaterial) object; a world where God exists and knows all 
logical and mathematical truths by direct intuition, including all Gödel propositions.31 None of 
these worlds refer to God creating a material universe. Hence, similar to the first type of possible 
worlds, for the worlds of the second type I do not assume the possibility of matter arising from 
consciousness. Moreover, similar to the worlds of the first type, there are no good reasons for 
why the possible worlds of the second type would be inconceivable. There are no wholly 
unexplained ontological gaps. Given a possible world where God exists, it’s not inconceivable 
that God could reveal himself to another immaterial person, or be good and know his moral 
nature, or know he is God, or create nothing, or create an causally inert external immaterial 
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object, or know all logical and mathematical truths. Moreover, appealing to a possible world 
where God exists for the argument is not question begging or conceptually contradictory or 
otherwise problematic.32 So, plausibly, the worlds of the second type I appeal to are conceivable 
as well. Moreover, strictly speaking I do not need to appeal to a possible world where God exists 
and reveals himself or where God exists and creates an external object. I can respectively appeal 
instead to a possible world where God knows he is God or where God decides to create 
nothing.33 So even if appealing to both worlds is for whatever reason problematic, I can do 
without them.  
To summarize: at no point do I appeal to the possibility of matter arising from 
consciousness to defend the premises of the argument or to derive the conclusion from them. It is 
only after the conclusion of the modal-epistemic argument has been established – that is, 
established without relying upon the possibility of matter arising from consciousness – that we 
can derive that it is possible for matter to arise from consciousness. Here’s how. If there is a 
personal first cause in every possible world (as the conclusion of the modal-epistemic argument 
has it), the actual world contains a personal first cause. The actual world clearly also contains a 
material universe. But then the personal first cause – being a conscious being – is the (in)direct 
cause of the material universe. So matter can arise from consciousness. In any case, the earlier 
mentioned alleged profound difficulty for the argument does not arise – regardless of whether I 
am able or not able to provide a compelling narrative of how matter could arise from 
consciousness.  
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One may rebut that in that case the many correlations between brain states and mental 
states as empirically discovered by the neurosciences provides ample evidence that 
consciousness can arise from matter (as Q asserts) – even though we are not able to provide a 
compelling narrative of how this could in fact be true. This rebuttal is however ineffective 
because those correlations are epistemically compatible with both emergence accounts and 
mind–body interaction dualism and thus by and in themselves those correlations do not justify 
the claim that consciousness can arise from matter. After all, on mind–body dualism matter does 
not produce consciousness. 
But let this all pass. Let me for the sake of argument assume that I need to provide a 
reasonable model of how matter could arise from consciousness. In other words, how could a 
personal first cause – being a conscious being – create a material universe? Could God have 
created ex nihilo? Is creation ex nihilo possible? Theists, one may say, need a proper account of 
how this could happen. For else theism becomes inconceivable. Well, let me bite the bullet and 
propose one. 
How could God have created a material universe out of nothing? Isn’t that metaphysically 
impossible? Now, surely, ex nihilo nihil fit. From nothing nothing comes. This metaphysical 
principle seems to me indisputable. Yet, creatio ex nihilo does not violate it. For God creating a 
material universe from nothing isn’t the same as a material universe coming out of nothing. After 
all, God is the originating cause of the material universe and God clearly is something rather than 
nothing. More specifically, the potency to create a material universe can be understood to reside 
in God’s power. Nevertheless, one might respond that it is also metaphysically impossible for an 
agent (even as powerful as God) to create something out of nothing. But is that indeed the case? 





substances, such as planets, trees, animals and humans directly out of nothing. But that is not the 
way creatio ex nihilo needs to be understood. Here is an alternative picture of creatio ex nihilio 
that is not only in accord with modern science, but does in fact seem metaphysically possible (or 
at least less impossible than the first scenario). God created initially no concrete objects. In the 
beginning God formed abstract objects from his thoughts. Afterwards God reified or 
hypostatized these thoughts as separately existing abstract objects. These abstracta were 
subsequently transformed by God into non-substantive concrete particulars (e.g., one or more 
singularities, space-times having radius zero or virtual particles having mass and charge zero). 
From these non-substantive concrete particulars, God brought substantive concrete simple 
objects into being. These substantive concreta evolved over a long period of time into the world 
of concrete composite substances as we know it. This multi-pass picture of creatio ex nihilo 
might in fact be the only metaphysically possible way to create a world of concrete substances 
out of nothing. If so, it explains why God created our world via a lengthy process of evolution 
from some non-substantive singularity instead of bringing it directly into being out of nothing. 
But again, let this all pass. Let me for the sake of argument suppose that the above model is 
not sufficiently intelligible to render creatio ex nihilo conceivable and thus (defeasibly or prima 
facie) metaphysically possible. Would the modal-epistemic argument then finally be defeated? 
No. For we could replace the first premise P1




‴   For every FoCons proposition p that is true in the actual world w there is some 
possible world w′ (such that p is true in w′ and) such that there is a subject in w′ that 






This weaker premise only requires that actually true FoCons propositions are knowableR. It is 
thus no longer required that all possibly true FoCons propositions are knowableR. Together with 
the second premise P2 it logically follows that there is a personal first cause in the actual world.  
Moreover, all evidence I provided34 for premise P1
″ carries over to the weaker premise P1
‴. 
Besides, the basic concepts of possibility, truth and knowability are ontologically so fundamental 
that we should reasonably expect any central relationship between them to be maximally uniform 
and natural. Now, plausibly, the vast majority of truths in the actual world is knowableR. Hence it 
is reasonable to hold that all such truths are in fact knowableR rather than there being some ad 
hoc exceptions. But this is exactly what the weaker premise P1
‴ expresses. 
So we still have a model-epistemic argument for God’s actual existence – even though it 
now no longer follows that God exists in all possible worlds. Whether this is so remains open. 
Wintein’s counterexample Q is not effective against this version of the modal-epistemic 
argument. For in order to refute this version of the modal-epistemic argument, it would 
obviously be question begging to assert that proposition Q is actually true instead of being 
merely possibly true. 
On the basis of above considerations I conclude that Wintein’s first objection fails. But 
since this is his strongest objection, I end this section with three additional remarks. 
First, to successfully block Wintein’s purported counterexample Q (“The only conscious 
beings are naturally evolved organisms”) I do not have to claim that Q is not possibly true. It’s 
sufficient to remain agnostic as to whether Q is possibly true or not. Such agnosticism is justified 
even if I assume a notion of conceivability strong enough to entail possibility. For due to the 
 





explanatory gap as described above, on such a notion of conceivability one can withhold 
judgement as to whether Q is conceivable or not. Note that I thus also do not have to claim that 
Q is inconceivable. 
Second, one may respond that on the assumed account of conceivability it is inconceivable 
that there are conscious beings other than naturally evolved organisms. So that there being a 
personal first cause becomes inconceivable. That might be so, but that doesn’t affect the modal-
epistemic argument. The argument only needs the weaker claim that a personal first cause is 
possible.35 One is not committed to hold that it is also conceivable by humans in the strong sense 
as described above. For there is no good reason to accept the reverse principle that possibility 
entails such a strong sense of human conceivability. What is claimed is that possibly there is a 
conscious being that is the first cause of reality. This claim is not unreasonable.36 For one thing, 
one doesn’t have to assume that the necessarily existing omni-God of classical theism is 
possible, which would surely be far more controversial. Nor does adding this claim as a premise 
render the modal-epistemic argument circular or otherwise epistemically insignificant37 After all, 
the argument, if successful, takes us from a personal first cause’s possible existence to its actual 
or even necessary existence. Wintein, to whose objections I reply, seems to agree. For notably 
none of his objections attack the assumption that a personal first cause is at least possible. 
Further, for a proposition to be conceivable in the assumed sense, an intelligible explanatory 
mechanism that makes it true needs to be provided. But on such a strong account of 
conceivability it might actually, regardless of whether a personal first cause is possible, not be 
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unreasonable to hold that a personal first cause is inconceivable. For how could such a 
mechanism be provided in the case of an ultimate first (uncaused) cause? 
Third, one may argue that even if we exclude for good dialectical reasons38 all 
counterexamples to the first premise that involve a blunt denial of the modal-epistemic 
argument’s conclusion (e.g., “There is no personal first cause”), the first premise is still 
obviously false if naturalism is necessarily true (allegedly because if the only possible conscious 
beings are naturally evolved organisms, we simply lack sufficiently powerful possible knowers 
to ensure that all possible truths are knowable), so that the first premise still begs the question 
against necessarily true naturalism. I would respond that in order to obtain an actual real 
refutation of the first premise and so to effectively force the proponent of the argument to 
abandon the first premise, the objector seems here to need to presume the necessary truth of 
naturalism and thus the falsehood of the conclusion of the modal-epistemic argument. If so, this 
would be dialectically inappropriate. Wintein and I agree that in the present context, of course, 
the falsehood of the conclusion of the modal-epistemic argument cannot be presupposed.39 
Various reasons have been offered in support of the first premise that are each independent of 
whether naturalism is necessarily (or actually or possibly) true.40 Also a wide range of alleged 
counterexamples – such as Gödel propositions or propositions about the elementary particles of 
quantum physics – have been refuted.41 These refutations are also independent of whether 
 
38 Ibid.,  391, 398; Wintein, “The Modal-Epistemic Argument for the Existence of God Is Flawed,” 314. 
39 Rutten, “A Modal-Epistemic Argument for the Existence of God,” 391, 398; Wintein, “The Modal-
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naturalism is necessarily (or actually or possibly) true. For it can be shown that of those alleged 
counterexamples the ones that only involve naturalistic propositions are (or can be) refuted by 
appealing only to possible (and in some cases extremely cognitively or physically advanced) 
naturally evolved knowers. This all warrants at least prima facie the adoption of the first 
premise. Thus, if one wants to cogently refute the first premise, then instead of proposing 
counterexamples that involve a blunt denial of the argument’s conclusion or merely purporting to 
point out that the first premise doesn’t sit well with naturalism, one has to show that those 
supporting independent reasons are bad, or one has to gather independent evidence of a positive 
sort that there really are exceptions to the first premise. The latter is precisely what Wintein aims 
to do in his paper42 and earlier in this section I argue that his attempt is not successful. But let 
these considerations pass. More importantly, I would argue that as long as blunt denials of the 
modal-epistemic argument’s conclusion are dialectically appropriately excluded as 
counterexamples to the first premise, it might in fact not follow that the first premise is obviously 
false if naturalism is necessarily true. After all, for each possibly true naturalistic proposition, it 
might very well be the case that there is always a possible world in which that proposition is true, 
in which there are natural laws that happen to be favorably suited for knowing it, and in which 
there are naturally evolved conscious beings that are intellectually and scientifically advanced 
and knowledgeable enough – and conceptually or geographically close enough to the vicinity of 
its relevant truth-makers – to actually know it. But let this pass as well. For even more 
importantly, as earlier mentioned, the modal-epistemic argument deploys in fact the premise that 
a personal first cause is at least possible, so that naturalism being necessarily true is excluded by 
the premises of the modal-epistemic argument. And as stated as well, adding the mere possibility 
 





of a personal first cause as a premise is not unreasonable and doesn’t render the modal-epistemic 
argument epistemically irrelevant. As to the closely related objection that the first premise begs 
the question against actually true or possibly true (but not necessarily true) naturalism, I would 
respond that here again the objector seems to have to bluntly deny the argument’s conclusion – 
which is as said dialectically inappropriate – in order to force the proponent of the argument to 
actually abandon the first premise. But let this pass. More importantly, if we again dialectically 
appropriately exclude all counterexamples that involve a blunt denial of the conclusion of the 
modal-epistemic argument, it becomes clear that in this case the first premise is not obviously 
false at all. For now one can appeal to the possible existence of a personal first cause and such a 
being is a quite powerful knower indeed. Such a knower can be invoked to refute many alleged 
counterexamples to the first premise. I thus conclude that the closely related objection fails as 
well. 
To conclude this section, let me briefly say two further things about the argument. First, 
even if the first premise P1″ turns out to be untenable after all, one may, as mentioned, replace it 
by the weaker P1‴. In that case we still get the striking conclusion that if a personal first cause 
possibly exists, it also actually exists. Since necessary existence is not part of the definition of a 
personal first cause, this doesn’t reduce the argument to an ontological argument of sorts. 
Second, I surely do not claim that the modal-epistemic argument is on its own sufficient to 
establish God’s existence. If successful, it merely increases the overall likelihood of God’s 
existence. The argument can then be included in a cumulative case for theism and this case 
would then need to be compared with a cumulative case against theism. But this is not part of the 






6. Closing Remarks 
In this paper I presented and discussed Wintein’s four objections against my modal-epistemic 
argument for God’s existence. Two of his objections involve an alleged counterexample to 
respectively the first and second premise of the unabridged version of the argument. Wintein’s 
other two objections are respectively a parody objection to what he calls the core argument 
(which extends to a parody objection to the modal-epistemic argument) and the claim that the 
core argument already clearly reveals itself that the modal-epistemic argument is circular (i.e., 
presupposes its conclusion). I argued that all four objections fail. The modal-epistemic argument 
still stands.  
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